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The Future of Euthanasia
and Physician-Assisted Suicide:
Beyond Rights Talk to Informed Public Policy
Ezekiel J. Emanuel*
In Washington v. Glucksberg' and Vacco v. Quill' the Su-
preme Court Justices did the right thing by rejecting a constitu-
tional right to physician-assisted suicide (PAS) or euthanasia.'
They also reached the correct decision in not foreclosing state
legalization of these interventions. The decisions will foster a
lively debate in the states about the ethics and political pru-
dence of permitting these interventions. Although a few Justices
held out hope for a more narrow constitutional right to PAS or
euthanasia, the majority holdings permanently shifted the forum,
the arguments, the perspective, and the justifications in the de-
bate over PAS and euthanasia. The forum is no longer the
courts, but the legislatures and public squares. The arguments
are no longer about constitutional rights, but ethics and prudent
policies. The perspective is no longer first person, but third per-
* Chief, Department of Clinical Bioethics, Warren G. Magnuson Clinical
Center, National Institutes of Health. B.A. Amherst College; M.Sc. Oxford
University; M.D. Harvard Medical School; Ph.D. Harvard University. I would
like to thank Louisa Smith, J.D., for invaluable comments and criticisms of
the manuscript and Amy Gutmann, Ph.D., for useful discussions on the issue
of euthanasia.
1. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
2. 117 S. Ct. 2293 (1997).
3. "Physician-assisted suicide" is defined as the process whereby a phy-
sician provides the a prescription or other means to a patient with the explicit
understanding and intention that the patient use the medications or other
means to end his or her life. When I use the term "euthanasia" without
qualification, I mean voluntary active euthanasia. Voluntary active euthana-
sia involves a physician administering medications or other means to end the
patient's life at the patient's request and with the patient's full informed con-
sent. The primary difference between the two is that in physician-assisted
suicide the patient commits the life-ending act, whereas in euthanasia the
physician or some other medical provider carries out the life-ending act. See
Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Euthanasia: Historical, Ethical, and Empiric Perspec-
tives, 154 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1890 (1994).
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son. And the justifications no longer appeal to individual auton-
omy and beneficence, but to probable social goods and harms.
This is as it should be in a democracy.
As the debate proceeds, however, it must be better informed.
The debate needs to move away from this or that heart-
wrenching case calling out for euthanasia, shake off the distor-
tions concerning end-of-life practices that have so far informed
it, and carefully examine what likely benefits and harms might
result from legalization. This means that there will be even more
emphasis on accurate empirical assessments of likely practices
and consequences related to PAS or euthanasia. Current as-
sumptions about PAS or euthanasia based on abstract argumen-
tation and logical inferences will need to be tested empirically if
public policy is to be prudent. Some of these assumptions al-
ready have been shattered by empirical assessment. But others
will require a commitment to collect additional data to make
public debate more informed.
This Article will be divided into four sections. Part I briefly
states my thesis and background assumptions. Part II considers
the potential situations that might lead to recognition of a nar-
row constitutional right to PAS or euthanasia seemingly antici-
pated by some of the Justices of the Supreme Court. I will argue
that such situations do not arise and that the possibility of secur-
ing a constitutional right to PAS or euthanasia is dead. In Part
III, I will consider two myths about PAS and euthanasia-the
myth of pain and the myth of separation.4 We are debating the
legalization of PAS and euthanasia as if the terminally ill who
would want to use these interventions are those suffering from
pain. Taking this as the paradigmatic case distorts the issue,
because most people requesting a physician to assist them in
committing suicide do so not as a result of pain but as a result of
depression or concerns about being a burden on others.' As Ore-
gon's Measure 16 indicates,6 many people engaged in the debate
also claim that we can separate PAS from euthanasia. This is
practically impossible. These myths distort reality and need to
be shattered. Finally, in Part IV, I will draw upon existing em-
pirical information to consider prudential arguments for legalizing
PAS or euthanasia. I will suggest that the potential benefits of
4. The myth of separation is the notion that we can separate physician-
assisted suicide from euthanasia. Although this distinction can be made con-
ceptually, in practical terms it is extremely difficult.
5. See infra Part 1II.B.
6. OR. REV. STAT. § 127.8 (1996).
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permitting PAS or euthanasia are much smaller than imagined.
I will finish by suggesting, however, that an adequate evaluation
of benefits and harms requires much more information.
I. PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE, EUTHANASIA,
AND END-OF-LIFE CARE
Before we begin to consider the implications of the Supreme
Court decisions, we should be clear about our goal. The real ob-
jective must be to improve the care of the 2.3 million Americans
who die each year This is an enormous task. In part it is
problematic because, despite their words, Americans still find it
enormously difficult to face death and to comfort the dying. It is
still not uncommon for people who visit a dying person to com-
ment "I donft know what to say or to do." And this says it all-
we still do not know how to be with and talk to dying people.
The task is also difficult because the entire medical system itself,
from education to health care delivery, is only now beginning to
seriously address the issue of caring for the dying.
There is no logically necessary reason why advocating or le-
galizing PAS or euthanasia will improve the way we care for
dying patients. Care for the dying is much more complex than
ending a patient's life. Furthermore, there is good sociological
reason to think that the focus on PAS or euthanasia creates a
curve in the shape of an inverted U. That is, while some atten-
tion to PAS and euthanasia may increase commitment to mak-
ing improvements in end-of-life care, significant attention to
PAS and euthanasia is likely to have the opposite effect. This is
because our society possesses limited resources-limited time,
intellectual focus, political capital, media attention, and mana-
gerial acumen. Some focus on the issues of PAS and euthanasia
might be draw attention to persistent problems in our social
practices of, say, pain management, treatment of depression, or
use of hospice. These revelations, in turn, might lead to im-
provements in the way we care for the dying. Too much focus on
PAS and euthanasia, however, will displace care for the dying as
the central issue and absorb limited resources that might be de-
voted to real change. I fear that more litigation, more campaigns
for referenda to legalize PAS and euthanasia, and more conferences
on PAS and euthanasia will distract our attention and consume
7. See Robert N. Anderson et al., Report of Final Mortality Statistics,
1995, in NAT'L CENTER FOR HEALTH STATIsTIcs, 45 MONTHLY VrrAL STAT.
REP. tbl7 (Supp. 2 1997).
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energy that should be focused on the broader issue of caring for
the dying. And in this regard, I may be as guilty as anyone in
the country.
I. AFTER GLUCKSBERG AND QUILL, IS THERE STILL
ROOM FOR A RIGHT TO PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED
SUICIDE OR EUTHANASIA?
In concurring opinions, several of the Supreme Court Jus-
tices did not completely reject the idea of a constitutional right to
PAS or euthanasia. By imagining certain factual circumstances
and legal arguments not before the Court, these Justices left
space open for a more limited right to PAS or euthanasia than
that argued for by the respondents in Quill and Glucksberg.
These potential exceptions, as articulated by Justices O'Connor
and Breyer,9 seem to fall into two broad categories: (1) situations
in which PAS or euthanasia is the only alternative to a slow and
painful death because the state does not permit adequate pain
relief, and (2) situations in which "death with dignity" requires
facilitation of death by a physician. The specter of such excep-
tions will tempt proponents of PAS or euthanasia to consider
additional courtroom challenges. A close examination reveals,
however, the factual predicates of these exceptions are so un-
likely to occur that it is virtually certain they will never be used
to affirm even a narrow constitutional right to PAS or euthanasia.
If the Supreme Court does some day affirm a right to the assis-
tance of a physician in dying, the decision will merely be a reac-
tive ratification of what has already become an entrenched state
law right. In other words, the constitutional avenue for legaliz-
ing PAS or euthanasia has reached a dead end.
A. THE O'CONNOR EXCEPTION-THE SADISTIC STATE
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor argued that
consideration of a generalized right to PAS or euthanasia could
be avoided because currently dying patients who are experiencing
great pain and suffering can obtain whatever palliative care
modern medicine has to offer, even to the point of "unconsciousness
and hastening death."'" The O'Connor opinion implies that if the
state imposed significant barriers to prevent dying patients from
8. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2303 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
9. See id. at 2310 (Breyer, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 2303 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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receiving adequate palliative care and forced them to endure
unnecessary pain, then the Court might consider a more narrow
right to PAS or euthanasia.
While this potential exception seems principled in a hypo-
thetical sense, it fails to comport with reality. No advanced state
would want its dying people to experience unremitting pain that
could be relieved. It is difficult to imagine what set of circum-
stances would compel a state to force dying patients to suffer
pain. Only a "sadistic" state, interested in using the physical
pain and suffering of its citizens as a method of oppression and
political suppression, would obstruct palliative care for no sub-
stantive reason. It is hard to imagine that one of the fifty United
States-or any democratic state-would trade in such "sadistic"
practices. A reasonable state might restrict appropriate palliative
care for dying patients only if, in some way, providing the pallia-
tive care created or substantially contributed to other serious so-
cial problems-drug addiction, elder abuse, murder. Under such
circumstances, the state might have good reason to balance the
interests of dying patients against other state interests. And
while the Court would carefully examine such balancing, it
would likely show deference to the judgment of state legisla-
tures, which have much better access to the empirical data
needed to balance interests."
Justice O'Connor's exception seems to suggest that radical
changes in social practices would be necessary to get her to re-
consider the Court's holdings. Because these requisite changes
are almost unimaginable, it seems very unlikely that Justice
O'Connor's line of analysis can result in a constitutionally pro-
tected right to PAS or euthanasia.
11. As Justice Souter noted in his opinion:
While an extensive literature on any subject can raise the hopes forjudicial understanding, the literature on this subject is only nascent.
Since there is little experience directly bearing on the issue, the most
that can be said is that whichever way the Court might rule today,
events could overtake its assumptions .... Legislatures, on the
other hand, have superior opportunities to obtain the facts necessary
for a judgment about the present controversy. Not only do they have
more flexible mechanisms for factfinding than the Judiciary, but
their mechanisms include the power to experiment, moving forward
and pulling back as facts emerge within their own jurisdictions.
Id at 2292-93.
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B. THE BREYER EXCEPrION-DEATH WIM DIGNrrY
In his concurring opinion, Justice Breyer stated that there
might "roughly" be a "right to die with dignity" encompassing a
right to PAS or euthanasia.2 In his view, this right would be
justified by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of certain
fundamental liberty interests encompassing privacy as well as
"personal dignity, medical treatment, and freedom from state-
inflicted pain."3 Assuming such a train of justification can be
sustained, how are we to understand Justice Breyer's "right to
die with dignity"? Why would it encompass a right to PAS or
euthanasia? Justice Breyer contends that this "right to die with
dignity" has at its core three components: "personal control over
the manner of death, professional medical assistance, and the
avoidance of unnecessary and severe physical suffering."4 Many
people-including many opponents of PAS and euthanasia-
agree that individuals should have personal control over the
manner of their death and should have the power to avoid un-
necessary physical suffering. What makes Justice Breyer's per-
spective capable of justifying PAS or euthanasia is the requirement
of "professional medical assistance.""5 Without this criterion of
medical assistance, Justice Breyer would be endorsing a right to
suicide, not a narrow right to PAS or euthanasia.
Importantly, Justice Breyer's view implies that there is not
a distinction between PAS and euthanasia for purposes of justi-
fication. 6 If a person has a right to control the manner of death
with professional medical assistance, then this reasoning must
include not only having a physician write a prescription but also
having the physician inject life-ending drugs.
More significantly, however, Justice Breyer's opinion begs
the questions of why this "right to death with dignity" requires
"professional medical assistance." After all, one hardly needs
professional medical help to die or to commit suicide. With over
31,000 people successfully committing suicide each year in the
United States, suicide ranks as the nation's ninth leading cause
12. Id. at 2311 (Breyer, J., concurring).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Below, I will argue that the distinction between physician-assisted
suicide and euthanasia is a practical impossibility. See infra Part 11.C.
[Vol. 82:983988
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of death. 7 This constitutes approximately 1.4% of the 2.3 million
deaths that occur in the United States every year."
By implication, therefore, we can conclude that, in Justice
Breyer's view, professional medical assistance is necessary to
add the element of dignity to death. No doubt many people will
find this position somewhat ironic: In an era when many com-
mentators call for the demedicalization of death-the goal of al-
lowing death to happen at home, away from doctors and their
high-tech apparatus-precisely to ensure "death with dignity,"
one of the nation's most prominent jurists has endorsed in-
creased medicalization of the dying process as the means by
which to achieve dignity. This irony suggests we should think
through Justice Breyer's analysis a bit more carefully.
It is difficult to conceive of why Justice Breyer would believe
that "death with dignity" necessitates professional medical assis-
tance. In his very short opinion, Justice Breyer never explains or
justifies the claim. Justice Souter may have more clearly elabo-
rated Justice Breyers meaning when he drew an analogy between
abortion and PAS without professional medical assistance:
It is, indeed, in the abortion cases that the most telling recognitions of
the importance of bodily integrity and the concomitant tradition of
medical assistance have occurred .... The analogies between the
abortion cases and [PAS] are several .... Without physician assistance
in abortion, the woman's right would have too often amounted to noth-
ing more than a right to self-mutilation, and without a physician to as-
sist in the suicide of the dying, the patient's right will often be confined
to crude methods of causing death, most shocking and painful to the
decedents survivors."
Importantly, Justice Souter does not argue that without profes-
sional medical assistance there is no effective or real right to
death with dignity. He argues only that intentional death with-
out medical assistance might be "crude" and "shocking."
But there are serious problems with this argument. The
first concerns the respective harms that arise from the lack of
professional medical assistance. In the case of abortion, the
harm that can arise from lack of professional medical assistance
is physical injury, even death-what Souter appropriately calls
"self-mutilation."0 In the case of PAS, the harm is aesthetic-
what Justice Souter calls "crude" and "shocking." Notice that
17. See Anderson et al., supra note 7, at tbl.7.
18. See id.
19. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2288.
20. Id
2L Id-
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one set of harms is physical, encompassing damage to the body
and even existence, while the other set of harms is aesthetic, de-
noting damage to sensibilities and taste. The standard of physi-
cal harm is objective and widely agreed upon. Even if one be-
lieves that there are objective aesthetic standards, however,
there is much greater difficulty in defining them in the public
sphere. This distinction displays itself in many other areas of
social practice where we permit exercise of rights when they
cause aesthetic offense but not physical harm. For example,
many people find some instances in which people exercise the
right to free speech or to assembly-such as Nazi marches,n
burning the American flag,' Hustler magazine24 -crude and
shocking. Yet while we strongly protect the exercise of rights
that use crude and shocking methods, we prevent the exercise
of these very same rights when they might lead to serious physi-
cal harms, even harms to the speaker or actor.26
Furthermore, the analogy between surgical abortion and
PAS is seriously flawed and should not be used to justify the
same kinds of protections. As Table 1 makes clear, these are
very different actions that occur in different places and require
different skills.
TABLE 1. COMPARING SURGICAL ABORTION AND PAS
Surgical procedure Medical procedure
Performed in a hospital Performed in a patients home
or special clinic
Requires sterile conditions Does not require sterile conditions
Implements not readily available Medications readily available,
to patients or "on the street" either over the counter or already
in patienfs possession
A "botched job" results in physi- A "botched job" results in life
cal harm or death 1_1
22. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
23. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
24. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
25. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("[It is often true that
one man's vulgarity is another's lyric.").
26. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that free
speech principles prevent a state from proscribing the advocacy of violence or
lawlessness except where such incitement is intended to produce such effect
and is likely to do so).
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A closer analogy to PAS would be medical abortion. With the
availability of medical abortions utilizing RU 486 or other medi-
cations, the necessity of professional medical assistance for abor-
tions significantly decreases or even disappears. Indeed, the fact
that with medications abortion can be done outside the hospital, in
the privacy of a woman's home, is why anti-abortion advocates are
fighting so strenuously the production and distribution of RU 486
in the United States.27 And yet even in this case it is important to
note that the medications for medical abortion-RU 486,
methotrexate, or colchine-are not available over the counter. Nor
are these medications readily available to women who might need
abortion to protect their lives. Conversely, terminally ill patients
typically do have prescriptions for medications, like narcotics and
sleeping pills, that can be used to commit suicide.
Finally, an empirical claim buried in Justice Souter's argu-
ment needs examination. Is it actually the case that suicide
methods without professional medical assistance are crude and
will shock the decedent's relatives? Would the lack of profes-
sional medical assistance prevent dying patients from ending
their own lives in a painless manner?
A glimpse at a well-known practitioner of assisted suicide
and euthanasia begins to answer these questions. After the
confiscation of his "suicide machine," Jack Kevorkian has been
using carbon monoxide inhalation to carry out PAS and eutha-
nasia.' This method of suicide is available to anyone with a car
or who purchases a carbon monoxide canister. It requires nei-
ther specialized information nor professional medical assistance.
Neither does it utilize Dr. Kevorkian's medical training as a pa-
thologist. This method does not seem to inhibit people from
seeking out Kevorkian's services or leave relatives of the de-
ceased shocked. Indeed, the relatives are sufficiently satisfied
that they praise Kevorkian in courts.
Even beyond the Kevorkian example, Souter's assumption
about the aesthetic unpleasantness of unassisted suicide seems
27. On February 3, 1998, newspapers reported that a letter mailed to the
news agency Reuters claimed responsibility for the recent bombing of an
abortion clinic in Birmingham, Ala. The letter threatened future bombings
would be directed at the manufacturers and distributors of RU 486. See
"Army of God" Claims It Bombed Clinic, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1998, at A5.
28. Of the 33 suicides assisted by Dr. Kevorkian between 1990 and 1996,
nearly all of those died by inhaling carbon monoxide. See Jim Irwin, Kev-
orkian Aids 33rd Suicide, Takes Body to Hospital, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh, N.C.), July 11, 1996, at A7, available in 1996 WL 2887430.
1998]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
wrong. Although most current, successful suicides are violent 9--
occurring by gunshot or jumping off bridges-others are pain-
less, certainly as painless as a prescription for narcotics, barbi-
turates, or muscle relaxants. Moreover, dying patients do not
live with empty medicine cabinets. Almost all dying patients-
and certainly those dying of cancer and AIDS-have more than
enough narcotics and sleeping pills to end their own lives. Phy-
sicians typically provide prescriptions for a thirty-day supply of
such drugs, so that their terminally ill patients do not constantly
have to visit the pharmacy or return to the office for a new pre-
scription.
When prescribed narcotics, sleeping pills, carbon monoxide
inhalation, or even Tylenol are mentioned as effective methods of
suicide, there are typically two responses. One is that people
just do not know about this. The problem with this response is
that in the United States there are tens of thousands of suicide
attempts each year by these very methods. This strongly sug-
gests that these suicide techniques are not secrets successfully
kept hidden by the medical establishment."
The second response is one of squeamishness: "Suffocation
by carbon monoxide is awful"; 'Tylenol-induced liver failure is a
horrible way to go." This reaction is likely the "shock" referred to
by Justice Souter. Such responses suggest, however, another
reason that professional medical assistance is believed to be nec-
essary to a death with dignity, a reason that has nothing to do
with the crudity of the method. Professional medical assistance
for suicide does not dignify the means so much as it does the act
itself. Professional assistance medicalizes the suicide in a manner
that legitimizes the act. By providing the life-ending prescrip-
tion or injecting the life-ending drug, the doctor in the white
coat, the authority figure imbued with elevated social standing
and prestige, adds social sanction to the act of intentionally ending
one's life. By participating as a recognized authority figure, the
physician conveys society's view that this action is appropriate
and worthy. By requiring professional medical assistance, inten-
29. In the United States, "violent" cannot be deemed the same as "crude"
and "shocking." Furthermore, it is unclear whether dignity demands medical
assistance just because suicide is carried out in a violent way.
30. Indeed, the social barrier to discovering such information may provide
a good test of how much a person really desires to end his or her life, one
analogous to Oregon's requirement that patients ask for PAS more than once
and wait at least fifteen days after the request for the receipt of the prescrip-
tion. See OR. REv. STAT. § 127.850 (1996).
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tionally ending one's life is no longer condemned but permitted.
Instead, the doctor's active participation signifies social valida-
tion. This reassures the patient and family. The physician does
not so much deploy "less crude" techniques-in many cases the
doctor is prescribing the very same pills the patient could use on
his or her own-as sanction the action. Life-ending prescription
or injection by the doctor is a social blessing, the secular version
of last rites. Having the doctor perform the life-ending act ren-
ders the action itself, not the technique, less crude, shocking,
isolating'
Social acceptance is essential to "dignity" because dignity is
a social construct. Dignity involves the gaze of others; it requires
public acceptance and affirmation of one's actions. This dynamic
reveals, however, an important contradiction in the views of PAS
and euthanasia advocates. These advocates claim that their goal is
a neutral right that does not condemn or praise PAS or eutha-
nasia. They assert that they want people to live their own lives by
their own lights, make "those grave judgments for themselves, free
from the imposition of any religious or philosophical orthodoxy
by court or legislature."32 However, the necessity of professional
medical assistance in realizing this vision-not for any methodo-
logical expertise but for its imprimatur of dignity-suggests that
the grave judgments inherent in PAS and euthanasia are not
merely, or even dominantly, individual but very much require so-
cial approval. The necessity of society's approval, however, trans-
fers the proper fulcrum of the debate from rights to policy. The
logic of Justice Breyer's proposed exception, therefore, inevitably
leads one to the conclusion that the legislature, not the Court, is the
proper forum for the debate about PAS and euthanasia.
C. THE SOUTER PERSPECTIVE-DEFERENCE TO THE STATES
Adopting a Frankfurtian posture, Justice Souter argued in
his concurrence that the Court should not displace the experi-
31. It is worth noting that there is no active campaign to have euthanasia
performed or suicide assisted by non-physicians. The idea of technically competent
and proficient non-physician specialists in ending life-thanatologists-has never
generated any support. If the above argument is correct, this is because pa-
tients want the social blessing that can only be conferred by socially-respected
professionals and not by just a good "death mechanic." There is no interest in
having the life-ending actions performed without the social prestige offered by
the medical profession.
32. Ronald Dworkin et al., Assisted Suicide: The Philosopher's Brief, N.Y.
REv. BooKs, Mar. 27, 1997, at 41, 43.
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mentation of various state legislatures by recognizing a right to
PAS. The Court, he suggested, might reconsider and ratify such
a right once it has become socially accepted, after state experi-
mentation and evolution of social values:
One must bear in mind that the nature of the right claimed, if rec-
ognized as one constitutionally required, would differ in no essential
way from other constitutional rights guaranteed by enumeration or de-
rived from some more definite textual source than "due process." An
unenumerated right should not therefore be recognized, with the effect
of displacing the legislative ordering of things, without the assurance
that its recognition would prove as durable as the recognition of those
other rights differently derived. To recognize a right of lesser promise
would simply create a constitutional regime too uncertain to bring-with
it the expectation of finality that is one of this Court's central obliga-
tions in making constitutional decision.... While I do not decide for all
time that respondents' claim should not be recognized, I acknowledge
the legislative institutional competence as the better one to deal with
that claim at this time."
In Justice Souter's view, the Supreme Court should not de-
clare the existence of such unenumerated rights, but rather
should ratify a social process that creates and accepts these
rights. This perspective properly shifts the discussion away
from abstract, first-person arguments of principle and toward
third-person interest-balancing and the empirical assessment of
the utility of protections and regulations.
III. THE POLICY QUESTION OF LEGALIZING
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE OR EUTHANASIA
A. INDIVIDUAL CHOICE VS. SOCIAL PRACTICE
Consideration of PAS or euthanasia as a matter of policy
rather than right requires a shift of perspectives, from the moral
to the political. In any individual case that might be raised in
the media or in the courts, proponents and opponents of PAS
and euthanasia might agree on the wisdom of administering life-
ending drugs. Once the debate moves to the state legislatures,
however, the issue is not the appropriateness of PAS or eutha-
nasia in a particular case but rather its appropriateness as a
matter of social policy. Citing the wishes of a suffering individ-
ual, or even a few thousand suffering individuals, or expressing
what one would personally want if placed in certain terrible cir-
cumstances, no longer becomes dispositive. The real issue is
33. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2293 (1997).
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whether it is prudent to have a general rule that potentially
makes PAS or euthanasia available to almost all terminally ill
patients. Therefore, we need to consider not just particular
cases but the impact on the care for terminally ill patients gen-
erally. And we need to be sure that we are making these as-
sessments accurately.
The current debate is being conducted via myths. The two
most important are the myth of pain and the myth of separation.
These myths frame policy considerations for a nonexistent world.
B. THE MYTH OF PAIN
We are using a working-model which fails to fit the facts that we really
wish to talk about....3
A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it... 2
The policy debate over the legalization of PAS and eutha-
nasia has been distorted. It employs the wrong working model,
thereby preventing proper deliberation.36 The debate about PAS
or euthanasia is dominated by the picture of a terminally ill per-
son forced to suffer horribly without relief. This is the picture
that comes to mind any time the words physician-assisted sui-
cide or euthanasia are mentioned. It is also the scenario invoked
by advocates when they seek public approval for these tech-
niques?' The trouble is that the picture fails to fit the facts.
One of the most vivid invocations of this picture to justify
PAS and euthanasia occurred in the Ninth Circuit's ruling in
Compassion in Dying v. Washington:
Americans are living longer, and when they finally succumb to illness,
lingering longer, either in great pain or in a stuporous, semi-comatose
condition that results from the infusion of vast amounts of pain killing
medications. Despite the marvels of technology, Americans frequently
die with less dignity than they did in the days when ravaging diseases
typically ended their lives quickly. AIDS, which often subjects its vie-
tims to a horrifying and drawn-out demise, has also contributed to the
34. STANLEY CAVELL, MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAT? 97 (1969).
35. LUDWIG WITGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 115 (1968).
36. See CAVELL, supra note 34, at 97.
37. Another case that comes to mind is that of a patient with Lou Gehrig's
disease confined to a wheel chair. The general problem with invoking patients
with this disease to justify physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia is that the
disease is progressive and the patient is usually already on a respirator.
Death can be had by terminating life-sustaining interventions-the respira-
tor-without the need for physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia.
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growing number of terminally ill patients who die protracted and pain-
fUl deaths.38
The polling data indicate a similar public perception. The
only way to elicit significant public support for PAS or euthanasia
is by asking either a very general, hypothetical question or one
specific to a patient in pain. One standard polling question has
been asked since the late 1940s, and its response has been fre-
quently cited by legalization advocates as demonstrating public
support for PAS of 60-70%: "When a person has a disease that
cannot be cured, do you think doctors should be allowed by law
to end the patient's life if the patient and his or her family re-
quest it?"39 The only other type of question about PAS or eutha-
nasia that elicits similar public approval asks some variation of
this question: "If a terminally ill person who is conscious and
suffering a great deal of pain asks his or her doctor to administer
lethal drugs or injections that would end the person's life?"'
This suggests that when asked in an abstract or hypothetical
way about PAS or euthanasia the "picture" that comes into peo-
ples minds is the patient in pain. This interpretation is supported
by the fact that public support for PAS or euthanasia drops dra-
matically when the scenario is not one of a patient in pain, but of a
bedridden patient, a patient worried about burdening the family,
or a patient who just finds waiting for death purposeless.4
38. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 812 (9th Cir. 1996)
(en banc), rev'd sub nom. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). It
is one of the ironies of this appellate court decision that it presents contradic-
tory views about the role of medical technology in the physician-assisted sui-
cide or euthanasia debate. On the one hand, technology is a cause of the in-
terest in physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia because it keeps us alive
and changes the demography of the dying to more chronic illnesses. On the
other hand, the court argued that interest in physician-assisted suicide or
euthanasia is ancient, going back at least 2,500 years, well before the advent
of any medical technology, and that medical technology in many cases can re-
duce pain that causes interest in euthanasia. How can advances in medical
technology "cause" interest in physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia and yet
there be interest before the advent of that very technology? Further, with the
effectiveness of technology in reducing pain, interest in physician-assisted
suicide or euthanasia should be obviated. See generally Ezekiel J. Emanuel,
The History of Euthanasia Debates in the United States and Britain, 121
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 793 (1994).
39. Robert J. Blendon et al., Should Physicians Aid Their Patients in Dy-
ing? The Public Perspective, 267 JAMA 2658, 2659 (1992) (reporting data de-
rived from surveys conducted by various polling organizations).
40. Id. at 2660.
41. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted
Suicide: Attitudes and Experiences of Oncology Patients, Oncologists, and the
Public, 347 LANCET 1805, 1805 (1996).
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When the Supreme Court Justices discussed PAS and
euthanasia they invoked the same picture of patients in pain. In
their mind, this image of excruciating pain is the quintessential
and standard case in which people request PAS or euthanasia.
Justice O'Connor considered circumstances in which patients in
pain might be denied palliative care as constitutive of those in
which there might exist a right to PAS 2 Justice Breyer argued
that a right that encompassed PAS could exist when 'the law's
impact upon serious and otherwise unavoidable physical pain
[accompanying death] would be more directly at issue."43 Justice
Stevens discussed "avoiding intolerable pain and the indignity of
living ones final days incapacitated and in agony" as central to
considerations in favor of PAS" These comments occurred in
the course of the Justices' exploration of when PAS would be
justified, but they constitute more than just the cases in which
they think these interventions would be acceptable. Citing these
circumstances of "intolerable pain" and "umavoidable physical
pain" reveals that these are precisely the instances in which the
Justices imagine requests for PAS or euthanasia would arise.
Like everyone else, the Justices believe that intolerable pain is
the paradigm for requests of PAS, making it the standard for the
consideration of sufficient justification.
The picture of a patient writhing in pain and begging for
PAS or euthanasia is, however, largely a myth. All the avail-
able evidence indicates that there is virtually no causal con-
nection between pain and interest in PAS or euthanasia. Using
intolerable pain as the framework in which to think about PAS
or euthanasia, distorts the assessment of their benefits and
harms. There are two sources of data on the reasons patients
have for requesting PAS or euthanasia: (1) interviews with phy-
sicians who have received requests for and have performed PAS
or euthanasia, and (2) interviews with patients who might be in-
terested in PAS or euthanasia. The four studies of physicians
who have performed PAS or euthanasia, summarized in Table 2,
show that pain is given as any part of patients' reason for re-
questing PAS or euthanasia in about one third of the cases and
is given as the sole reason in only 5-11% of the cases.
42. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2303 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
43. Id. at 2312 (Breyer, J., concurring).
44 Id. at 2307 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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TABLE 2. PAIN AS A FACTOR IN REQUESTING PAS OR
EUTHANASIA (PHYSICIAN STUDIES)
DbTiilH s Du Duc WASIL
Painisanypartof 46% 29% 32% 35%
the justification I II
Pain is the sole or 5.3% 11% 0% NAmijustificationIII
Additional data come from three studies examining the
reasons for interest among patients who might be candidates
for PAS or euthanasia. In the first study, among 378 HIV-
infected patients (90% of whom qualified for an AIDS diagnosis),
55% had considered PAS; experiencing frequent or persistent
pain was not a predictor for having considered PAS.49 In a sec-
ond study, 27.3% of cancer patients had serious thoughts about
PAS or euthanasia and 11.9% had serious discussions about
PAS or euthanasia."0 Again, experiencing pain was not a pre-
dictor for thoughts or discussions about PAS or euthanasia.
Indeed, cancer patients experiencing pain were (1) more likely
to find PAS or euthanasia unacceptable, (2) more likely to state
that discussion of PAS or euthanasia with the physician would
not increase trust, and (3) more likely to change physicians if
their physician mentioned that he or she had provided PAS or
45. See Paul J. van der Maas et al., Euthanasia and Other Medical Deci-
sions Concerning the End of Life, 338 LANCET 669 (1991).
46. See M.T. Muller et al., Voluntary Active Euthanasia and Physician-
Assisted Suicide in Dutch Nursing Homes: Are the Requirements for Prudent
Practice Properly Met?, 42 AM. J. GRIATRICS Soc'y 624 (1994).
47. See GERRIT VAN DER WAL & PAUL J. VAN DER MAAs, EUTHANASIE EN
ANDERE MEDISCHE BESLISSINGEN ROND HET LEVENSEINDE-DE PRAKTIJK EN
DE MELDINGSPROCEDURE (1996); Paul J. van der Maas et al., Euthanasia,
Physician-Assisted Suicide, and Other Medical Practices Involving the End of
Life in the Netherlands, 1990-1995, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1699 (1996).
48. See Anthony L. Back et al., Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthana-
sia in Washington State: Patient Requests and Physician Responses, 275
JAMA 919 (1996).
49. See William Breitbart et al., Interest in Physician-Assisted Suicide
among Ambulatory HIV-Infected Patients, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 238, 238
(1996).
50. See Emanuel et al., supra note 41, at 1808.
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euthanasia." In the third study, this one of 988 patients with
terminal cancer, heart disease, lung disease and other terminal
conditions, 10.5% had thought about ending their life with PAS
or euthanasia and 3.7% had discussed PAS or euthanasia with
someone.Y Again, terminally ill patients experiencing severe or
moderate pain were not more likely than patients not experi-
encing significant pain to have considered or discussed PAS or
euthanasia.
These results suggest that two dominant factors unrelated
to pain motivate patients to desire PAS or euthanasia: (1) depres-
sion and (2) caregiving needs that place burdens on the patients'
loved ones. According to the studies of physicians represented in
Table 3, the leading reasons for PAS or euthanasia are concern
about being a burden, loss of dignity, and depression.
TABLE 3. REASONS FOR PAS OR EUTHANASIA (PHYSICIAN
STUDIES)
1990 1994 1996 1996
DUTcH53 DuTcH DUTOi WASiL
NURSING STATE&
HoME $
Depression NA! NA NA 55%
Being a burden 33% 28% NA 75%
Loss of dignity 57% NA 56% 72%
Similarly, in the studies involving interviews with AIDS and
oncology patients, depression and the burden of high caregiving
needs consistently show up as the most important factors de-
termining patient interest in PAS or euthanasia, as is illustrated
in Table 4.
51. See id. at 1808-09.
52. See D. Fairclough et al., Interest in Euthanasia and Physician-
Assisted Suicide Among Terminally Ill Oncology Patients: Results from Com-
monwealth-Cummings Project, J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY (forthcoming 1998).
53. See van der Maas et aL, supra note 45.
54. See Muller et al., supra note 46
55. See VAN DER WAL & VAN DER MAAS, supra note 47; van der Maas et
al., supra note 47.
56. See Back et aL, supra note 48.
57. NA means that these options were either not asked or not reported in
these studies. The Dutch did not include this as a response category.
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TABLE 4. FACTORS PREDICTING PATIENT INTEREST IN PAS AND
EUTHANASIA (PATIENT STUDIES)
IN.Y. ] A M'~ PATISNTIN-
Statistically signifi- 1) Depression 1) Depression 1) Depression
cant factors predict- 2) Hopelessness 2) Poor physical 2) High caregiv-
ing patient interest 3) Fewer social functioning ing needs
in PAS or euthana- supports 3) Longer ill-
sia 4) Being a bur- nesses
den
Every study conducted suggests, then, that the conventional
portrait of the person who is interested in PAS or euthanasia is
inaccurate. This of course does not mean that there are no indi-
vidual terminally ill patients suffering intolerable pain who do
in fact want PAS or euthanasia to relieve their misery. How-
ever, these data indicate that this patient is not the norm. The
debate over the wisdom of PAS or euthanasia should turn on the
rule rather than the exception. If tough cases make bad law,
then surely we need the proper case for discussing the prudence
of legalizing PAS or euthanasia. And the proper, paradigmatic
case of a terminally ill patient who desires PAS or euthanasia is
the depressed person who requires a great deal of care from his
or her family.
If the working model were appropriately altered, relevant
actors would suddenly be much less inclined to consider PAS or
euthanasia acceptable. There are few people who would be
willing to justify PAS or euthanasia based on its benefit for de-
pressed terminally ill patients or those needing a great deal of
care. Indeed, the polling data show that Americans are much
less inclined to consider PAS or euthanasia acceptable for pa-
tients who want it because they worry about being a burden."
Only about a quarter of Americans support PAS or euthanasia
for patients who want it because they do not want to be a burden
on their family.'2
58. See Breitbart et al., supra note 49.
59. See Emanuel et al., supra note 41.
60. See Fairclough et al., supra note 53.
61. See Emanuel et al., supra note 41, at 1807.
62. See id.
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C. THE MYTH OF SEPARATION
The debate in the United States surrounding legalization fo-
cused initially on both PAS and euthanasia. Nonetheless, many
proponents of PAS and euthanasia interpreted the defeat of the
Washington and California referenda in the early 1990s as a re-
pudiation of euthanasia alone. Some have argued on principle
that PAS is preferable to and distinct from euthanasia because it
provides the added safeguard of requiring the patient to take the
medications. Others seem to advocate legalizing PAS as a stra-
tegic move because public opposition is less. This theory may
presume that once the public becomes accustomed to the practice
of PAS, the public is likely to become less resistant to the legali-
zation of euthanasia. Whatever the motive, the public debate is
now couched in terms of legalizing PAS alone.63
The separation between PAS and euthanasia is conceptually
tenable. As I have suggested in critiquing Justice Breyer's view,
however, the separation in justification seems problematic.' If
the justifications for PAS are personal control over the manner
of one's own death, professional medical assistance, and the
avoidance of unnecessary suffering, then these justifications
should hold equally for euthanasia. Furthermore, there is the
problem of patients who are so debilitated that they cannot end
their own lives even with medications. For these people PAS
would not realize any of the advantages claimed by advocates.
The justification for PAS for those who are physically capable of
ending their own lives should encompass euthanasia for those
who physically cannot end their own lives.
Most importantly from a policy perspective, the separation
of PAS and euthanasia is impossible to operationalize. One
problem is that if physicians do not understand the difference
between PAS and euthanasia, then it cannot affect their prac-
tices. Data suggest that physicians frequently label actions as
PAS when in fact the actions are euthanasia.65 Physicians' ter-
minology is influenced by two factors. First, physicians and
other medical providers focus on euthanasia because it is the
63. The Oregon experiment exemplifies this trend by permitting only
physician-assisted suicide. See OR. REv. STAT. § 127.805 (1996) (providing
that a capable adult "may make a written request for medication" to end his
or her life).
64. See supra Part II.B.
65. See Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., The Practice of Euthanasia and Physi-
cian-Assisted Suicide Among Oncologists: Adherence to Safeguards and Ef-
fects on Physicians (submitted 1998).
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action they feel most implicated in and uncomfortable about.'
From the public debate they understand euthanasia as a situa-
tion in which the "physician injects into the patient life-ending
drugs."7 They then classify as PAS all actions that are intended
to end the patient's life but do not involve the physician injecting
the medication. Consequently, when physicians write an order
for a hospital or hospice nurse to inject the patient with life-
ending drugs, they do not view this as euthanasia but as PAS
because the physician is not actually doing the injecting. Yet, by
commonly accepted definitions, such action constitutes eutha-
nasia." It might be thought that through proper education phy-
sicians could better learn the difference between euthanasia and
PAS. But it is difficult to imagine more effective educational
initiatives than all the media coverage of the PAS and euthanasia
controversy and the concomitant medical conferences and rounds
on the topic.
There is however a second-and more important-reason
why it will be hard to permit PAS but prohibit euthanasia: fail-
ures. Today, most suicide attempts fail. Failures will likely
continue even when there is professional medical assistance.
The most effective oral drug cocktail with which to end a life is
not known, and many physicians report feeling uncertain about
what to prescribe. 9 Furthermore, even with appropriate drugs
and instructions from the physician, patients may fail to execute
the instructions correctly. One survey of oncologists who have
acknowledged participating in euthanasia or PAS suggests that
as many as 20% of PAS incidents fail to end the patient's life."
Any appropriate policy would have to consider how to handle
these PAS failures. In the Netherlands, euthanasia is viewed as
a necessary "back-up" to PAS. The Dutch ethos is for the physi-
cian to be in close proximity to the patient performing PAS-if
the drugs fail to end the patient's life, the physician should then
provide euthanasia. For the Dutch, euthanasia is viewed as a
necessary "back-up" to PAS. This may be why in the Netherlands
euthanasia occurs almost six times more frequently than PAS. 1
66. See Emanuel et al., supra note 41, at 1807 (describing medical pro-
fessionals' greater comfort with physician-assisted suicide).
67. See Emanuel, supra note 3, at 1891.
68. See id.
69. See Melinda A. Lee et al., Legalizing Assisted Suicide: Views of Physi-
cians in Oregon, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 310, 313 (1996).
70. See Emanuel et al., supra note 65.
71. See van der Maas et al., supra note 47.
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It seems highly unlikely that a state will prosecute physi-
cians who commit euthanasia thinking they were performing
PAS, or who commit euthanasia because they were remedying a
PAS failure. Practically speaking, then, there will be no distinc-
tion between PAS and euthanasia. We should therefore stop the
charade of arguing only about legalizing PAS. While PAS and
euthanasia are conceptually distinct, from a social policy per-
spective this distinction cannot be sustained. The real choice is
to legalize both PAS and euthanasia, or to legalize neither.
IV. WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS OF LEGALIZING
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE AND EUTHANASIA?
Anyone honestly examining the issue will acknowledge that
there are both benefits and harms from legalizing PAS and
euthanasia or keeping them illegal. Because of the illegality of
PAS and euthanasia, some terminally ill patients who want to
end their lives suffer needlessly.' Some other people would find
reassurance just from having the option of PAS and euthanasia
available, even if they never actually used the procedures. Le-
galization would certainly benefit these people. Against these
benefits one must weigh the harms. Legalization would inevi-
tably result in abuses: patients coerced into ending their lives;
patients given PAS or euthanasia without having received all
palliative care interventions; patients ending their lives for eco-
nomic reasons; nonconsenting patients having their lives ended.
Dan Brock, a strong advocate for PAS and euthanasia, forth-
rightly acknowledges that whatever safeguards are imple-
mented, they would "substantially reduce,... not... eliminate,
the potential for abuse.' The real question, then, is whether
the acknowledged benefits of legalization outweigh its acknowl-
edged risks.
While there has been significant debate about the potential
harms from legalizing PAS and euthanasia, there has been al-
most none about the extent of likely benefits. It is as if the
benefits of legalization are somehow "obvious" and do not need
72. Although it should be mentioned that even in the current situation in
which physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia are illegal, some patients re-
ceive these interventions and have their lives ended. We do not know the
number, but we do know that about 15% of oncologists have acknowledged
performing physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia. See Ezekiel et al., supra
note 41; Back et al, supra note 48.
73. Dan W. Brock, Voluntary Active Euthanasia, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Mar.-Apr. 1992, at 10, 20.
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delineation or quantification, while at the same time the potential
harms need to be extensively assessed. But what are the likely
benefits? Are they really so substantial?
Proponents typically identify three main benefits to legali-
zation: (1) ensuring the integrity of autonomy; (2) reducing
needless pain; and (3) providing reassurance to terminally ill
patients. 4 Opponents counter with four main dangers: (1) a re-
duction in the moral integrity of medical care; (2) a reduction in
commitment to quality end-of-life care; (3) coercive pressure on
patients to utilize PAS or euthanasia; and (4) expansion of prac-
tice to intentionally ending the lives of patients for whom PAS is
not justified, such as patients who have not been provided opti-
mal palliative care, depressed patients, or mentally incompetent
patients."
Some of these benefits and harms are, no doubt, difficult to
evaluate. For instance, few would challenge the proposition that
autonomy is a fundamental American value76 and that preserv-
ing the integrity of our social values should be an objective of our
social policies. However, the exact link between valuing auton-
omy and legalizing PAS or euthanasia is subject to interpretive
disagreement. So, too, is the connection between legalizing as-
sisted suicide and the integrity of the medical profession. These
interpretive disagreements are unlikely to be resolved within
our democratic system. This realistic assessment should not be
construed to denigrate or dismiss the importance of further de-
liberation about these issues. Further debate can clarify the areas
of agreement, narrow interpretive difference, and reveal some of
the practical implications of the different interpretations.
The relevant considerations for legalization are more ex-
pansive, however, than the potential effects on autonomy and
medical professionalism. It is worth examining these factors
both to clarify existing policy choices and to identify interpretive
gaps in order to define the data needed by legislatures to make
fully informed policy choices. Though some benefits and harms
can be empirically assessed, deficiencies in the available data
74. See Should Physicians Aid Their Patients in Dying? The Public Per-
spective, 267 JAMA 2658, 2659 (1992); Brock, supra note 73, at 14; Emanuel,
supra note 3.
75. See Emanuel, supra note 3; David C. Thomasma, When Physicians
Choose to Participate in the Death of Their Patients: Ethics and Physician-
Assisted Suicide, 24 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 183, 193 (1996).
76. See Rogers M. Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEm L.
REV. 175, 175 (1982) (charting the rise of autonomy as a fundamental value).
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render any assessment of the benefits from legalizing PAS or
euthanasia little more than guesswork. Nonetheless, by relying
on knowledge of practices in the Netherlands, current practices,
and projections about the effect of removing legal barriers, we
can make useful educated guesses about likely actual practices.
A. How MANY TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS MIGHT BENEFIT FROM
LEGALzING PAS OR EUTHANAsA?
To understand who might benefit from using PAS or eutha-
nasia, we need to understand the epidemiology of death. In the
United States, just over 2.32 million people die each year. Two
thirds of these people are over sixty-five years of age, and about
0.5% are under eighteen years of age' Not all deaths are pre-
ceded by a "dying process." That is, many deaths have no
"prodrome" in which the person is recognized to be dying and
could choose to have PAS or euthanasia. Deaths from sudden
heart attacks, strokes, raptures of aortic aneurysms, certain viral
infections, motor vehicle and other accidents, and violent crimes
are sudden events without an identifiable preceding "dying proc-
ess." While there are no firm data on how many deaths are
acute and how many have a "dying process," I estimate that ap-
proximately half of all deaths in the United States occur among
adults who have a preceding dying process. This accounts for
about one million deaths per year.79 Not all of these dying adults
are mentally competent and capable of requesting PAS or
euthanasia. We have no good data on what proportion of people
77. This is the latest number projected for 1997. A measurement several
years old puts the number at just over 2.27 million. See U.S. NAT'L CENTER
FOR HEALTH STATISTICs, 1993 VITAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 96
tbl131 (1993).
78. See id. at 95 tbl130.
79. This calculation is obviously a very rough estimate. It is based on the
idea that there are (1) slightly under 50,000 deaths among those under 18
years of age; (2) 70,000 deaths from accidents among those over 18 years of
age; (3) 30,000 suicides; and (4) 15,000 deaths by homicide. In addition, there
are 150,000 strokes, most of which are acute, and 82,000 cases of acute pneu-
monia and influenza distinct from emphysema. In addition, there are 750,000
deaths from heart disease. A crude guess is that about half are sudden death
either from myocardial infarction or arrhythmia. Conversely, we can estimate
the number of deaths with prodrome or recognizable dying process. In this
case, there are approximately 525,000 deaths from cancer; 100,000 deaths
from emphysema; 375,000 deaths from cardiac disease such as congestive
heart failure; 37,000 deaths from AIDS; and about 15,000 deaths from liver
disease, such as cirrhosis. Some of the 50,000 or so deaths from diabetes are
acute from insulin overdoses, diabetic ketoacidosis, or acute infections. This
accounts for just over one million deaths per year. See id. at 96 tbl.131.
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who die are mentally competent within the last six months of
their lives. But because dementia increases with age and death
occurs disproportionately among those over sixty-five, a signifi-
cant proportion of those who experience a dying process are
likely to be incompetent and unable to request PAS or euthanasia
for themselves. To take the high side, however, we can estimate
that there are about one million people over eighteen years of
age who are mentally competent and have a recognizable "dying
process."
The question of what proportion of these one million Ameri-
cans who die each year could benefit from PAS or euthanasia if
legalized is problematic because it requires settling on the precise
circumstances in which people would find providing PAS or
euthanasia beneficial. The scenario in which PAS and eutha-
nasia are most widely-although not universally-viewed as
justified is when the dying person suffers from unremitting
physical pain.0 This circumstance receives the strongest public
support and is the one cited by the Supreme Court Justices as
being most persuasive.8' Beyond this core circumstance, the
"benefits" of using PAS become much more controversial and,
correlatively, public support dramatically declines. 2
There are two ways to estimate the percentage of the one
million patients who experience a "dying process" who also have
such unremitting pain that PAS or euthanasia might be a justi-
fiable option. First, current data suggest that in the months be-
fore death approximately 80% of patients have little or no pain
80. The fact that pain is an expandable notion presents a problem with
using pain as the justifiable circumstance for physician-assisted suicide or
euthanasia. Soon every adverse condition will be reclassified as pain. The
phrase "pain and suffering" shows this tendency. The phrase suggests that
pain and suffering are interchangeable, as if every kind of suffering consti-
tutes pain, or that pain and suffering necessarily occur together, which is not
always the case since it is possible to have either one without the other. See
TIMOTHY E. QUILL, A MmWIFE THROUGH THE DYING PROCESS: STORIES OF
HEALING AND HARD CHOICES AT THE END OF LIFE (1996).
Once, when I was teaching a class and presenting the data on how de-
pression motivates patients to desire physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia,
a physician argued (without a sense of irony) that patients with depression
had "mental pain" that made physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia justi-
fiable in their circumstances. Justice Breyer may have specifically empha-
sized "unavoidable physical pain (accompanying death)" to preclude this aug-
mentation of claims about pain. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct.
2302, 2312 (1997) (Breyer, J., concurring).
81. See infra Part IH.B.
82. See infra Part fI.B.
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and about 20% of dying patients experience significant pain.83
These data are used to suggest that physicians undertreat pain.
It is frequently argued that with optimal pain management, only
about 5% of dying patients will have intractable, unremitting
pain." Using this figure, 50,000 dying patients per year (5% of
one million patients experiencing a dying process) would have
such unremitting pain that PAS or euthanasia might be viewed
as a tangible benefit.
The experience of significant, unremitting pain does not
necessarily correspond, however, to an interest in PAS or eutha-
nasia. Recent data from cancer patients suggest that slightly
over 10% of terminally ill patients with significant pain have an
interest in PAS or euthanasia and that only about 4% have dis-
cussed PAS or euthanasia." Data from HIV patients in New
York suggest that 53% of HIV patients with significant pain have
considered PAS."6 This means that among terminally ill patients
with unremitting pain we might estimate that between 5,000
and 25,000 might be interested in ending their lives through
PAS or euthanasia.87
A second method of estimating the number of terminally ill
patients for whom PAS or euthanasia might be a justifiable op-
tion is to extrapolate from data from the Netherlands. In the
83. See The SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Im-
prove Care for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand
Prognoses and Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatment (SUPPORT),
274 JAMA 1591, 1595 (1995). This study also reported that in the last three
days of life about 55% of patients experience significant pain. See id. How-
ever, this finding is based on reports of the patient's relatives, which fre-
quently are inaccurate.
84. See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, CANCER PAIN RELIEF AND
PALLIATIVE CARE (1990); Kathleen M. Foley, The Treatment of Cancer Pain,
313 NEw ENG. J. MED. 84, 85 (1985).
85. Fairclough et al, supra note 52.
86. Breitbart et al., supra note 49, at 240.
87. These numbers are calculated by the following method: among the
50,000 people who die each year with unremitting pain despite optimal treat-
ment, between 10% and 50% might desire physician-assisted suicide or
euthanasia. However, the proportion of patients in pain who want physician-
assisted suicide or euthanasia is likely to be on the low side. Patients dying of
AIDS-which generates the higher number-tend to be younger and less re-
ligious, two factors that significantly increase interest in physician-assisted
suicide or euthanasia. See id. Yet, according to the Dutch data, 80% of pa-
tients receiving euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide are cancer patients;
AIDS patients are a very small proportion-less than 101-- of the patients
who receive euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide in the Netherlands.'
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Netherlands, 3.4% of all deaths are by PAS or euthanasia.88 But
0.7% occur in patients who are not competent when provided
euthanasia. An additional 0.3% were not terminally ill, as de-
fined by their physicians' estimate they would have lived longer
than six months when given PAS or euthanasia. 9 Overall then,
approximately 2.4% of all dying patients in the Netherlands
might receive PAS or euthanasia if the safeguards generally ac-
cepted in the United States were applied. However, pain plays
some role in motivating the request for PAS or euthanasia in
only about a third of these cases.' Thus, using the Dutch data,
in only about 0.8% of all deaths is PAS or euthanasia provided
for reasons of significant pain. Applying such figures to the 2.32
million deaths in the United States suggests that under 25,000
patients per year would utilize PAS or euthanasia to relieve ex-
cruciating pain refractory to optimal treatment.
Remarkably, these two different approaches produce fairly
consistent estimates, suggesting that the "benefit" from legaliz-
ing PAS or euthanasia for the relief of pain can be reliably esti-
mated to affect between 5,000 and 25,000 terminally ill patients
from among the 2.32 million Americans who die each year. Be-
cause some PAS or euthanasia occurs despite illegality (although
we do not know exactly how much), the "net" benefit of having
legalization is likely to be lower.
We have only very limited data on the question of how many
patients in the "dying process" might benefit from the reassur-
ance provided by knowing that PAS or euthanasia would be po-
tentially available. In the only study that asked patients and
the public about such issues, approximately 40% indicated that
their level of trust would increase if they discussed the availability
of PAS or euthanasia with their physician.' Importantly, an
almost equal number indicated that their trust would be reduced
by such a discussion. 2 Interestingly, patients with severe pain
and patients whose cancer recurred indicated that such discus-
88. See van der Maas et al., supra note 47, at 1701 tbl.1.
89. See id. at 1700. According to the agreed-upon safeguards in the
Netherlands, patients seeking physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia do not
need to be terminally ill. See Gerrit van der Wal et al., Evaluation of the No-
tification Procedure for Physician-Assisted Death in the Netherlands, 335 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1706, 1706 (1996). The most recent data suggest that as many
as 10% of patients receiving physician-assisted suicide or euthanasia would
have lived longer than six months.
90. See supra Part II.B.
91. See Emanuel et al., supra note 41, at 1808.
92. See id.
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sions would not improve their trust and reassurance.93 While
such data are tenuous at best, they do suggest that there is no
net "reassurance" benefit from legalizing or permitting PAS or
euthanasia.
B. How MANY TERMINALLY ILL PATIENTS MIGHT BE HARMED
FROM LEGAIZING PAS OR EUTHANASIA?
The major potential harms of legalization for which some
empirical data exist are (1) coercive pressure on patients to
commit suicide, (2) application of the intervention to patients
who have not received all appropriate palliative measures, and
(3) application of the intervention to patients incapable of con-
senting. Some data indicate that financial pressures arising
from end-of-life medical care do correlate with preferences by
families to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment for
patients.' This suggests that the possibility of coercive pressure
is real. Nevertheless, there is a shortage of reliable data by
which to quantitatively estimate the frequency with which fi-
nancial and other pressures might induce patients to express an
interest in PAS or euthanasia, cause families to desire PAS or
euthanasia for their dying relatives, or lead families to pressure
patients into receiving PAS or euthanasia. While data on these
issues are very difficult to generate, they are very important and
should be a priority. Coercive pressure by families on patients to
end their lives is hard to detect, and is unlikely to be restrained
by currently proposed procedural safeguards.
There is also a concern that patients may receive PAS or
euthanasia before exhausting palliative care options. The only
data that bear on this are data from the Netherlands, where in
at least 9% of cases physicians admitted that euthanasia was
provided despite additional palliative interventions that could
have been utilized.95 Since these data relied on physician ad-
mission of undertreatment, they are likely to be low. There are
anecdotal reports both in the United States and the Netherlands
of cases in which depressed patients were provided PAS or
euthanasia either without any treatment or with inadequate
treatment. But there are no reliable quantifiable data on this
93. See id.
94. See Kenneth E. Covinsky et al., Is Economic Hardship on the Families
of the Seriously Ill Associated with Patient and Surrogate Care Preferences?,
156 ARcHivES INTERNAL MED. 1737 (1996).
95. See Muller et al, supra note 46.
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point. Nor are there data on how many patients request and re-
ceive PAS or euthanasia whose pain, shortness of breath, fa-
tigue, nausea and vomiting, and other symptoms have not been
optimally treated.
A final concern is that patients will receive PAS without
their consent. In the Netherlands, in 0.7% of all deaths (20% of
all PAS and euthanasia cases), a patient who is not competent
receives euthanasia. 6 Just over half of these patients at some
time voiced interest in euthanasia, but subsequently became in-
competent and could not consent at the moment of injection. In
these cases, we do not know whether the patient's interest had
persisted or whether the patient had changed his or her mind.
Nevertheless, 48% of patients (or 0.35% of all deaths in the
Netherlands) had never expressed an interest in euthanasia and
yet were given euthanasia when they were mentally incompe-
tent. 7 Translating this figure to the United States would result
in more than 7,000 deaths per year of patients who have not
consented. Similarly, data from physicians in the United States
who acknowledged participating in PAS or euthanasia indicate
that in 15% of these cases, patients' lives were intentionally
ended, either by the physician or the family with the physician's
assistance, without the participation of the patient in the deci-
sion either because the patient was incompetent or was not
asked to consent."
In sum, it is difficult to estimate quantitatively how many
patients would be at risk of receiving PAS or euthanasia inap-
propriately in the event of legalization. There are worrisome an-
ecdotes. There are also experiences in the Netherlands suggest-
ing that 7,000 or so people might be given euthanasia in the
United States without their consent, that there are likely to be
many others who will request and receive PAS or euthanasia de-
spite inadequate palliative care, and there are likely to be that
others may be coerced into having their lives ended.
C. THE EFFECTvENEss OF SAFEGUARDS IN PREVENTING HARMS
It is frequently argued that by legalizing PAS or euthanasia,
it would be possible to implement safeguards that would prevent
harms and abuses. These claims are unpersuasive for at least
three reasons. First, simply because safeguards or guidelines
96. See van der Maas et al., supra note 47, at 1704 tbl.4.
97. See id.
98. See Emanuel et al., supra note 65.
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are enacted into law, there is no reason to think adherence will
be high, much less absolute. Legal protections may make it
possible to prosecute violations but this is far different from in-
creasing adherence to safeguards. The question of whether le-
galization will ensure adherence-or greater adherence-to
safeguards is an empirical question that cannot be assumed.
Second, the Dutch experience demonstrates that carefully
crafted safeguards, widely endorsed by the medical profession
and courts, do not necessarily lead to adherence. No matter how
one looks at the data, there are substantial violations of the
safeguards in the Netherlands. In 0.7% of all deaths, noncon-
senting people are given euthanasia. Disabled neonates are
given euthanasia, violating the requirement that euthanasia
only be for competent adults. Patients for whom optimal pallia-
tive care has not been provided are given euthanasia, violating
the requirement that all palliative measures be implemented
and the suffering be truly unremitting. One counterargument is
that while these cases are violations of the safeguards they are
nonetheless morally acceptable. In many cases-especially
those in which patients never consented to euthanasia or in
which palliative measures went untried-such a claim seems
disingenuous. Most importantly, adherence to specified safe-
guards is likely to be much higher in the Netherlands than in
the United States. The Netherlands is geographically small,
densely populated, and culturally homogeneous, making it a
much easier place than the United States in which to enforce
laws. Furthermore, the Netherlands provides universal health
coverage, which the United States does not. The Netherlands,
then, provides a best-case scenario; the violation of safeguards
and resulting harms are likely to be much more frequent in the
United States. Finally, while safeguards can minimi e abuse,
some harms will occur no matter what regulations and safe-
guards are in place.' Again, the real question is how the bene-
fits of legalizing PAS or euthanasia compare to the likely harms.
D. CoMPAING BENEFITS AND HARMS
It is impossible to overemphasize the tenuous nature of our
ability to predict what will happen if PAS or euthanasia is legal-
ized. We have some data that suggest that the benefits in terms
of relief of unremitting pain and reassurance of legalizing PAS
or euthanasia are comparatively small. This is not to dismiss
99. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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the harm caused to 5,000 to 25,000 people who endure needless
pain and who might be helped by having their lives ended. But
from a social policy perspective this is a small number in both
absolute and relative terms. We should not deceive ourselves
into thinking that improving the last few days of life of 5,000 to
25,000 patients constitutes a substantial intervention to improve
end-of-life care in the United States, where 2.32 million people
die each year.
Such benefits must be weighed against the harms of legali-
zation. Regrettably, the data do not permit any quantitative as-
sessment of harms. But we should not confuse this absence of
concrete data with the conclusion that there are no serious
harms. Indeed, with at least one million people per year facing a
dying process, the numbers of those at risk would dwarf the
numbers of those helped.
E. How, IF LEGALIZED, PAS AND EUTHANASIA
MIGHT EXPAND IN SCOPE
None of this even considers what might happen if we were
to lower the barrier to ending life and become acclimated to us-
ing PAS and euthanasia. Inevitably, if we legalize PAS and
euthanasia, they will become more accepted and commonplace.
Initially, it was hard for physicians, patients, and American so-
ciety to refrain from resuscitating every dying patient. Today
85% or more of hospitalized dying patients, and as many as 95%
of terminal cancer patients, die without resuscitation. Initially it
was hard for physicians, patients, and American society to ter-
minate respirators, dialysis machines, and other life-sustaining
technologies. Today, it is reported that as many as 90% of pa-
tients dying in intensive care units have life-sustaining treat-
ments withdrawn-an average of four withdrawn per patient."
As we become more accustomed to ending life, we also expand
the types of patients for whom we are willing to do it. Such ex-
pansion would inevitably happen if we were to legalize PAS or
euthanasia. This is well illustrated in the Netherlands where
between 1990 and 1995, there was an increase in PAS and
euthanasia from 2.7% of all deaths to 3.4% of all deaths-a 25%
increase in just five years.'
100. See K. Fuber-Langendoen, A Multi-Institutional Study of Care Given
to Patients Dying in Hospitals: Ethical Practices and Implications, 156
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2130 (1996).
101. See van der Maas et al., supra note 47, at 1701 tbl.l.
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Imagine if we legalize PAS or euthanasia. What will happen
as the baby boom generation ages? What will happen as the So-
cial Security system gets stressed and teeters on bankruptcy, as
the Medicare system becomes insolvent, as the costs of caring for
elderly parents increasingly burden families, and as the act of
intentionally ending life becomes more routine and accepted?
The most likely scenario is that PAS and euthanasia will expand
to include incompetent patients, Alzheimer's patients, and pa-
tients with strokes and other neurological diseases. Indeed, a
leading advocate of assisted suicide has advanced just this sce-
nario:
There is reason to expect that legalization of voluntary active euthana-
sia might soon be followed by strong pressure to legalize some nonvol-
untary euthanasia of incompetent patients unable to express their own
wishes. Respecting a person's self-determination and recognizing that
continued life is not always of value to a person can support not only
voluntary active euthanasia, but some non-voluntary euthanasia as
well... Recent history here is instructive. In the medical ethics lit-
erature, in the courts since Quinlan, and in norms of medical practice,
that right has been extended to incompetent patients and exercised by
a surrogate [often without explicit instructions from the patient]....
The very same logic that has extended the right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment from a competent patient to the surrogate of an
incompetent patient (acting with or without a formal advance directive
from the patient) may well extend the scope of active euthanasia. 10
If we begin legalizing PAS or euthanasia, the real harms are
likely to come not today or tomorrow but in the year 2010, when
demographic changes, financial pressures, and comfort with the
concept of assisted suicide combine to make the intentional
ending of a dying patient's life routine.
This is not meant to be a Cassandra-like prediction. It is
meant to make us understand that our actions today need to be
considered in light of their likely future impact. A sober assess-
ment based on our recent experience with the dying and the
added pressures brought about by the aging of the population
must be part of our cost-benefit calculus. Our choice about legal-
izing PAS or euthanasia today is really a choice about the future.
F. THE ETHICAL IMPERATIVE FOR EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
Oregon has decided to proceed with a social experiment.
Because of the importance of collecting much more empirical
data, we must be sure to rigorously assess the consequences of
Oregon's trial, no matter how difficult the studies are to conduct.
102. See Brock, supra note 73, at 20 (footnote omitted).
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If we fail to obtain additional data from Oregon, its social ex-
periment will be a failure because we will have learned nothing
from it. The priority list for research includes five areas neces-
sary to make prudent policy decisions:
(1) Evaluating the clinical care of those who request and
receive PAS, and determining what proportion of
those who receive PAS have received optimal pallia-
tive care and what proportion have not.
(2) Determining the reasons for requesting and receiving
PAS.
(3) Determining the proportion of patients for whom fi-
nancial demands and caregiving needs are high and
likely to play a role in the request for PAS.
(4) Determining the proportion of patients for whom
families initiated the process of requesting and receiv-
ingPAS.
(5) Determining how many cases of PAS result in failure
and what is done after the failure.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has rejected a constitutional right to
PAS or euthanasia while recognizing that in a democracy states
should be able to debate the merits of legalizing such interven-
tions. As we proceed in this debate, we must transcend the pro-
ponent-opponent dichotomy fostered by debating the constitu-
tional question. Opponents need to be honest and recognize that
in some cases PAS may be proper. Proponents need to recognize
that legalization will benefit few dying patients and that safe-
guards will not avert abuses and harms. Both sides need to be
clear about what legalization would entail. And here we have
much to learn. Terminal sedation, requests by dying patients
with extreme pain to have their lives ended, and inaccessibility
of life-ending medications are the exceptions, not the common
occurrence. We need to recognize that much more information is
needed to understand-and not just speculate about-the im-
pact, positive and negative, that legalization is likely to produce.
At the very least, all of those involved in the debate can agree on
the kinds of information we need to make more intelligent policy
judgments.
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